January/February 2005
FEATURE |
|
|
The Needle and the Damage Done
Vaccinating America's Soldiers
|
|
BY RICHARD CURREY |

Army medic Michael Berger was
told he would be at Walter Reed National Army Medical Center
“for a couple weeks, for a check-up and a few tests. And then,”
he said, “they told me I’d be on my way home.”
Berger reported to Walter Reed on February 17, 2004—and he has
been there ever since.
One year earlier, in February
2003, Berger reported for active duty after being called up from
his home in Marquette, Michigan. A 50-year-old staff sergeant
with 20 continuous years of service in National Guard units and
the Army Reserve, Berger was assigned to the 452nd Combat
Support Hospital out of Milwaukee and sent to Ft. McCoy,
Wisconsin, where he launched into “SRP,” the Soldier Readiness
Program.
“We were headed overseas,” Berger
said, “into the sand.” Although he wondered how he might fare
serving next to soldiers in their twenties, Berger was fit, a
runner, and a senior NCO with years of experience in medical
care. He was fully prepared to do his part. An enthusiastic
participant in the mobilization process, Berger volunteered for
instructional duties. He met the other soldiers in the unit,
including a lively young specialist named Rachel Lacy.
In short order, the soldiers of the 452nd underwent a day of
paperwork, including a detailed medical history. With a strong
family history of cardiovascular disease, including the loss of
his mother to a heart attack at age 43 and a brother who
suffered a stroke in his early forties, Berger underwent a heart
catheterization procedure in 1996. “My doctor thought I should
have the test because of my family history,” he said. “And the
results were negative. I wrote it all down on my medical history
form at Ft. McCoy. But if anybody took note of that history or
thought it represented any sort of concern or risk, I never
heard about it.”
A month after arriving at Ft. McCoy, in March 2003, Berger
received the standard battery of inoculations administered to
soldiers preparing for overseas deployment. The battery included
vaccines for anthrax and smallpox, as well as several other
infectious diseases.
Within 48 hours, Berger was
feeling “lousy.” It was as if, he said, “I was working on a case
of the flu. Along with that, I was experiencing some shortness
of breath and a heaviness in my chest. I figured it was the
vaccinations, but just in case, I checked in for sick call at
the TMC—the troop medical center.” Doctors gave Berger a “cold
pack” (a standard collection of medications to relieve symptoms
of colds and flu), and he returned to duty.
Another week passed with no
significant improvement in his condition. If anything, he was
worse. In addition to chest heaviness and breathing
difficulties, Berger said he “felt constantly exhausted.” He
returned to the TMC but was merely advised to “let the
medications work.”
The symptoms persisted over the next two weeks, but Berger
dismissed his discomfort as the physical stress of keeping up
with younger soldiers. On April 1 he was in the field, in the
midst of a training exercise and about to conduct a class on
intravenous fluid administration. Inside the tent where he was
slated to teach the class, his symptoms suddenly worsened. “I
just couldn’t catch my breath. I was feeling weak, light-headed,
and dizzy.” Within another few minutes “things got a little
hazy,” and Berger said he “went down on one knee. I told the
guys around me, ‘I think I’m in trouble.’ And sure enough I was.
All of a sudden it was as if I had a thousand pounds on my
chest. It was the textbook version of a heart attack.”
Berger was evacuated to a hospital in nearby La Crosse,
Wisconsin, where the heart attack diagnosis was confirmed. He
was placed in the hospital’s coronary care unit. Tests done the
following day revealed that Berger had almost complete
obstruction of a major artery supplying his heart. A stent was
placed in the clogged artery, and the attending cardiologist
contacted Ft. McCoy regarding Berger’s disposition.
The cardiologist was told that
appropriate cardiac rehabilitation services were available at
Ft. McCoy, and he released Berger back to the Army’s care. But
when Berger returned to Ft. McCoy on April 4, he quickly learned
there was, in fact, no cardiac rehab program of any sort on the
base. The point quickly became moot, since Berger was placed on
convalescent leave the following day. He was instructed to call
his family and “get someone to come down and pick you up.”
Berger realized there was no treatment plan, no doctor, and no
rehab in store for him. “They had no idea what to do with me,”
he said. “I guess it was easier for the Army to put me on
medical leave and get me out of there. Then my health problems
were my own.”
What Berger did not know was that Rachel Lacy, the young soldier
he met when he first arrived at Ft. McCoy—and who received the
same battery of vaccines—had died following the abrupt onset of
debilitating respiratory symptoms. She was, like Berger,
evacuated by ambulance to La Crosse where the first civilian
physician to see her immediately suspected she was suffering
from a vaccine reaction.
Berger, unaware of her death as he traveled north, found himself
“lying on the backseat of the car, in pain, undermedicated, five
days out from a major heart attack, on my way home to no
specific care or doctor and unsure of my Army status.” He felt
rejected by an institution he had served for 20 years, and he
traveled with an anxious uncertainty about what might happen to
him in the weeks to come.
There was still more Berger was
unaware of at the time he huddled in the backseat of his family
car on the long ride home. On March 18—two weeks after Berger
was immunized at Ft. McCoy—an American Indian nurse named
Deerheart Cornitcher received the smallpox vaccine at Peninsula
Regional Medical Center in Salisbury, Maryland. That evening she
felt nauseated and attributed it to a minor vaccine reaction or,
possibly, a mild case of food poisoning. Five days later she was
dead of a heart attack.
Cornitcher was among seven health
professionals vaccinated as part of a civilian readiness
program, all of whom developed post-vaccine problems. Another
vaccine recipient suffered a heart attack but survived, two
developed inflammation of the lining around the heart, and two
developed angina, the type of chest pain associated with heart
disease.
Three days after Cornitcher’s
death, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued a national
health advisory regarding smallpox vaccine and the apparent risk
of associated heart problems. The advisory recommended that
“persons with known cardiac disease not be vaccinated.”
Civilian smallpox vaccination efforts were suspended throughout
most of the country. On March 28, three days before Michael
Berger suffered a heart attack, the CDC issued a formal report
on adverse cardiac effects in association with the smallpox
vaccine. On that same day, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP)—the nation’s presiding arbiter for
policies related to vaccine safety—held an emergency meeting.
ACIP did not restrict its assessment to civilian programs,
noting that 10 cases of myopericarditis (heart inflammation)
already had been reported among the 240,000 primary military
vaccinees.
ACIP called the post-vaccine rate
of illness in the military “substantially elevated,” and found
“a causal relation between [heart inflammation] and smallpox
vaccination. Persons receiving smallpox vaccine should be
informed that [heart ailments] are a potential complication of
smallpox vaccination and they should seek medical attention if
they develop chest pain, shortness of breath, or other symptoms
of cardiac disease within two weeks after vaccination.”
Meanwhile, the autopsy report on Rachel Lacy noted that her
death was, in all probability, related to a severe vaccine
reaction. Her death certificate cites “post- vaccination
pericarditis” as an underlying cause of death. It also includes
“recent smallpox and anthrax vaccinations” as a contributing
factor.
At the time Michael Berger had a
heart attack, a national smallpox vaccine advisory was in effect
and the smallpox story had been carried by all wire services,
CNN, and covered in hundreds of newspapers, as well as on many
professional medical web sites. But if medical officers at Ft.
McCoy knew anything about the controversy, the newly issued
directives from both the CDC and ACIP, or the results of Rachel
Lacy’s autopsy, Berger said he—a medic assigned to a combat
support hospital—heard nothing about any of it.
While on convalescent leave,
Berger received a call from Ft. McCoy advising him to be back by
May 6, at which time he would be transferred to Ft. Knox,
Kentucky, where, he was told, “they have the facilities to
handle your kind of case.” A good thing, he thought, because he
had visited the local ER with chest pain twice while he was
home, afraid both times he was having another heart attack.
The ride from Ft. McCoy to Ft.
Knox took nine hours on a rickety Army bus, which arrived at a
barracks Berger characterized as “World War II vintage.” There
wasn’t room enough in that building for the entire group, so
Berger and a few other soldiers were taken to a second building
which was padlocked—with a condemned sign nailed to the door.
Finally, at a third building, Berger was billeted on the third
floor where, despite his post-heart attack status, he had to
struggle up three flights of stairs with his duffel bag.
Although Berger had been advised
that Ft. Knox was “where I would get the best care available,”
he quickly learned there was no cardiologist assigned to the
base, nor was there a cardiac rehab program. In fact, there were
inadequate numbers of Army doctors in general, and a civilian
contract physician handled Berger’s case.
Hired just days before Berger’s
arrival, the doctor had received no orientation on Army medical
policies. Although sympathetic to Berger’s predicament, he felt
there was little he could do. A civilian cardiologist, however,
visited the base, although he was a specialist in heart disease
in children. Still, that doctor renewed Berger’s medications and
prescribed an exercise regimen. As he performed his examination,
the doctor happened to inquire if Berger had ever received
either smallpox or anthrax vaccinations.
Berger said that he had.
“The doctor told me it looked
like the vaccines that some of us soldiers got might not be all
that safe,” Berger said. The doctor added that with Berger’s
family history of heart disease, “he was surprised the Army gave
me the shots at all.” Berger had heard something to this effect
when he had follow-up care in La Crosse before shipping out to
Ft. Knox, but this cardiologist seemed to speak with greater
certainty. “I asked the doctor what was going on, and he told me
there was evidence of a strong correlation between a family
history of heart problems and bad, even fatal, reactions to the
smallpox vaccine.”
During Michael Berger’s
frustrating summer in Kentucky, medical hold living conditions
similar to those at Ft. Knox were revealed on other bases, and
the military vaccine issue became more convoluted and
contentious.
In addition to the connection
between smallpox and heart disease, the anthrax vaccine was
implicated in a parade of catastrophic health effects, including
an abrupt and lethal pneumonia, heart failure, and blood
disorders. In May, as Berger was en route to Ft. Knox, Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan, a federal judge in Washington, D.C., ordered
the Department of Defense to stop using anthrax vaccine on the
grounds that it was an experimental drug.
The vaccine (the same one that
was used in the first Gulf War) never cleared U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) standards for human use before it was
administered to thousands of military men and women. Those
recipients were given the vaccine without their awareness or
consent, a flagrant violation of federal guidelines regulating
the use of experimental drugs or medicines in human subjects.
The FDA, however, outflanked the court order on a bureaucratic
technicality, solicited no public comment, and quietly
reapproved the vaccine.
By late July, the military
vaccine program had notched a trail of questionable deaths and
chronic illnesses, along with the outrage of those who were
finding themselves the targets of disciplinary proceedings, even
courts-martial, for refusing smallpox or anthrax vaccines. As
soldiers and their families began to alert congressmen and
senators, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Winkenwerder,
Jr., reported that the Army had identified 37 cases of heart
inflammation in the wake of smallpox vaccination—but no deaths.
Rachel Lacy’s death, it seemed,
was still categorized as “unexplained” by DoD. But in early
August, Rachel’s father told a UPI reporter that he was
convinced a proper investigation into the cause of his
daughter’s death was being blocked by the Army. He believed his
daughter died as a result of the smallpox vaccine, and the Army
was stonewalling in an attempt to avoid the criticism such a
revelation might bring.
Rachel Lacy’s father was seconded
in this opinion by Dr. Jeffrey Sartin, a physician who cared for
Rachel early in the course of her illness. Sartin, an infectious
disease specialist based in La Crosse—at the same hospital where
Michael Berger was taken after he collapsed at Ft. McCoy—said he
believed that Rachel Lacy’s illness and death should be
classified as vaccine related. “If she had been a civilian,”
Sartin said, “the case would almost certainly have been reported
as such.”
At the same time, conditions in medical hold facilities at
several bases were reaching a breaking point. In the course of
his stay at Ft. Knox, Berger recalled living in a decrepit
barracks some 60 years old that featured a roof open to the
elements. Buckets dotted the floor during thunderstorms. When
base authorities failed to respond to complaints, two soldiers
from the company—both on patient status— climbed onto the roof
and positioned a tarp. “Before they put the tarp up,” Berger
said, “you could see the stars at night through that hole.”
Michael Berger’s living conditions at Ft. Knox proved to be
symptomatic of overwhelmed Army medical facilities in general, a
system that seemed to be grossly unprepared for the many wounded
and ill soldiers who would inevitably be returning from a combat
theater—or whose illnesses, like Berger’s, would keep them from
deployment. UPI reporter Mark Benjamin, in a series of articles
that brought him a prestigious journalism prize, detailed
med-hold barracks in such poor repair that they were in danger
of collapse, and waits for doctor appointments and therapy
stretching out four to six months and longer. Benjamin wrote
that “in nearly two dozen interviews” soldiers consistently
“described substandard living conditions” and interminable waits
for any kind of medical attention.
After being at Ft. Knox for
nearly eight months (during which time all his heart care was
delivered by contract civilian doctors), a medical board found
Mike Berger unfit for duty. He was offered a ten percent
disability. Berger objected, noting that “a ten percent
disability wouldn’t even cover the cost of medications I have to
take for the rest of my life. Plus ten percent doesn’t entitle
me to full VA care.” Berger thought that, since he had suffered
his illness in the line of duty—and very possibly in direct
connection with vaccines the Army had ordered him to take—he
deserved more support in managing the results.
“But,” Berger said, “the med
board told me, in so many words, that this wasn’t their
problem.”
Berger fought the decision, but the board refused to budge. By
this time he had been officially classified as a “vaccine
reactor,” and while the board acknowledged his heart problems
“could have been caused by the smallpox vaccine,” there was
clearly no chance of improving their offer. Berger reluctantly
accepted the package and returned to Ft. McCoy for his
discharge.
Just two days before Berger was
to pick up his discharge papers, he had a phone call from
Janette Williams, a case manager at Walter Reed’s National
Vaccine Healthcare Center. “She knew a lot about me,” Berger
said. “But I’d never met her or spoken to her. She told me that
from my records it looked like I was a possible positive
smallpox reactor and the Army would like to bring me up to Reed
for a few days of study.”
Although Williams told Berger he was free to decline her offer,
she also advised him that his DD-214 “was unavailable” and his
medical board decision had been rescinded. Which meant that,
despite the suggestion that Berger had a choice in the matter,
he had no real option except to report to Walter Reed. Still,
Berger recalled, “Ms. Williams said I’d only be here for a
couple of weeks to a month. Just a few tests, and I’d be on my
way.”
Around this time the Army issued a statement that vaccines
“might have led to the death of Rachel Lacy,” and Sen. Jeff
Bingaman (D-N.M.) introduced a Senate resolution calling on
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to “review the military
vaccine program amid growing reports of serious side effects.”
Michael Berger enjoyed the holiday season at home with his
family in Michigan, and reported as ordered to Walter Reed on
February 17, 2004, where his “two-week stay” now approaches a
year.
And in that time his heart
condition continued to deteriorate.
Berger has characterized his care
at Walter Reed as “first rate,” even as his medical condition
worsens. Now struggling with leakage in two heart valves and the
re-closing of the artery that was stented after his heart
attack, he takes several medications and has been told by his
doctor that adhering to this regimen will give him “a normal
lifestyle for three to five years.”
Mike Berger has entered the medical territory where doctors can
watch, monitor, and intervene when necessary—but do little or
nothing to turn back the course of disease.
And just when he thought he
understood the medical verdict and the challenges ahead, Berger
was dealt another blow. In view of his declining health, Berger
requested a reevaluation of his earlier medical board decision.
“My condition is worse than it was at Ft. Knox,” Berger said.
“Nobody denies anymore that my problems are related to the
smallpox—and possibly the anthrax—vaccines. My doctor tells me
that I can anticipate a so-called normal life for only three to
five more years.”
It seemed reasonable to revisit the disability question, and a
hearing was scheduled for November 23. But there was never any
actual hearing. Berger was never given the opportunity to offer
testimony. He was never even called into the hearing room. After
Berger waited in a corridor for seven hours, his attorney
finally spoke, alone, to the hearing officer. “My lawyer told me
that my disability was sticking at ten percent, and that if I
argued about it, the board would rescind the offer and put me
back on active duty.”
Berger asked his lawyer if he could accept but file an objection
in writing. That counteroffer earned the same threat to rescind
the disability and return Berger to active-duty status.
“I recognized this was probably
an empty threat,” Berger said, “but the fact that the Army
thought intimidation was either needed or justified—I’ve kept
the faith, followed orders, gone where they sent me, cooperated
with all medical instructions, participated in the program here
at Reed. I’ve given the Army its due at every step of the way.
But enough is enough.”
Berger signed off on the medical board’s decision, “under
duress,” as he put it—but he also contacted the office of Sen.
Debbie A. Stabenow (D-Mich.), who launched a formal inquiry into
his case.
Michael Berger’s continuing story
is emblematic not only of an Army vaccine program gone awry, but
the deeper confusions and missteps that plague the use of
vaccines in the military at large. Service personnel are ordered
to receive immunizations that are judged to be in their best
interests—and also in the best interests of the service. This
stance is rooted in the very essence of command, where the good
of the many always supercedes the good of a few, and the primacy
of the mission is all.
Yet the fact remains that, at
least since the first Gulf War, vaccines have been administered
to U.S. troops that were not approved for human use and carried
significant questions about safety and even their ability to
induce immunity. Any soldier might question the wisdom of
receiving vaccines that never cleared standard FDA guidelines,
or carry known health risks for a significant percentage of
individuals, or have only marginal capacities to confer immunity
to any biological agent that might conceivably be used in a
combat scenario.
Michael Berger recalled what all
of us who served in any branch of the military recall: there is
no written or verbal “consent to treat” in military medical
settings. There is no opportunity to discuss or opt out of “shot
day” in recruit training or during mobilization. And if all
recruits are men in their late teens or early twenties who are
“vaccine-naïve” (as was often the case through the Vietnam era)
many less-adverse reactions are seen.
But times have changed. Women
serve. Older men serve. People who have received other vaccines
earlier in their lives serve. And many of these servicemen and
women may well have health histories—like Michael Berger—that
preclude receiving certain vaccines. At the moment,
servicemembers who refuse vaccination, even if on solid medical
grounds, are usually punished, more than a hundred so far by
court-martial.
On October 1, 2004, Rep.
Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) proposed a bill that would exempt
servicemembers from punishment for refusing to take smallpox or
anthrax vaccines. An act of Congress may well be the only way to
force the military to create and promulgate the regulations and
training needed to improve this aspect of its vaccine program.
On October 28, 2004, Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan (the judge who was foiled a year earlier when the
FDA hurriedly approved the anthrax vaccine under dubious
circumstances) ruled that the Department of Defense must cease
anthrax vaccination immediately, noting that FDA “acted
improperly when it approved the experimental injections for
general use,” and flatly called the military’s mandatory
vaccination program (which has immunized more than a million
troops in the last six years) “illegal.”
As for the dismal inadequacies at inferior and overcrowded
medical holding facilities at Army bases, a cascade of
complaints instigated a Senate investigation from the office of
Sen. Kit Bond (D-Mo.). But it remains unclear if this Army-wide
problem has been fully or adequately addressed.
“I’m not interested in playing
the disgruntled soldier,” Berger said. “I’m not looking to hurt
anybody or to get even with anybody or make a lot of noise for
no reason. From what I’ve been told the Army knew there was a
category of people that should not receive the smallpox or
anthrax vaccines, and I’m simply asking for accountability on
the part of the service I’ve served proudly for 20 years.”
Berger sees his situation as similar to an injury sustained in
the line of duty. “I was ordered to get the vaccines. I did so.
And doing so proved to be detrimental to my health. In what way
am I personally responsible for that? If I were wounded in
combat, there’d be no questions asked—I’d be cared for
until I recovered, and if I were disabled, I’d receive a
realistic disability pension. How is my situation different?”
Michael Berger is not sure what comes next. Sen. Stabenow’s
investigation is underway, and the labyrinth of the VA medical
system is waiting for him at home in Michigan. “It’s a step at a
time,” he said. “Right now, I’m just looking forward to being
back with my wife and kids.”